Abstract This paper examines the welfare effects of physically interconnecting two (network) markets that were previously separated. In each market a different set of capacity-constrained firms operate. Firms engage in a supergame and collude whenever it is rational for them to do so.We find that, under certain parametric restrictions, interconnection of the two markets reduces total welfare. The collusive horizon may extend from a single market to the overall integrated market. In such case, interconnection can be viewed as "exporting" collusion, rather than competition.
Introduction
A strong inclination towards market integration and physical interconnection has characterized the European Union policy in the last twenty years at least. It is supported by a number of studies, both in industrial organization and in international trade, that recognize market integration and interoperability as a source of welfare (see, e.g., Krugman and Obstfeld 2004; Markusen 1981) .
These theoretical works stress the benefits of integration, in terms of higher productive efficiency-through exploitation of economies of scale-and lower prices due to greater competition (see, for instance, Emerson et al. 1988) . However, on the empirical side, the issue is much less clear, and the evidence on the actual welfare effects of physical interconnection, which we will describe in greater details in the next section, is ambiguous. Our paper finds conditions under which openness and physical interconnection, contrary to the conventional view, facilitate collusion and reduce welfare. 1 In building our framework, we target network markets, and, in particular, electricity; the insights of the models may, however, naturally be applied to other sectors as well.
Our results depend on two crucial assumptions: First, the productive capacity of competing firms is limited. Second, firms collude whenever it is rational for them to do so. Both assumptions fit utilities markets, and, specifically, electricity. Generators' capacity in electricity is generally bounded; furthermore, transactions in electricity generation are often centralized in spot markets, where firms interact frequently, and information on firm's strategic variables is easily available. These features hint at the prospect of a market with a high collusive potential.
Under these circumstances, improved physical interconnection may bring about not only greater competition, but greater collusion as well. The core of the argument is the following: Without integration, one market may be characterised by a collusive (monopoly) price, while in the other one, capacity may be so large that such an outcome is impossible. However, when the markets are interconnected, the "excess" capacity in the second market may be diverted to the first one. Monopoly price might thus prevail in the integrated market, so that monopoly would be "exported" from the first market to the second one. When each firm's individual capacity is smaller than aggregate output at the prevailing collusive market price, each firm's deviation profit from the collusive agreement 2 is limited by the capacity constraint. As a consequence, in addition to the discount factor, it is the relation between aggregate capacity and the market size, and not the number of firms alone (as we have in the standard setting, without capacity constraints), that determines whether or not the monopoly outcome can emerge as an equilibrium of the collusive game.
Motivating evidence and literature review
The available evidence on the effects of interconnection is mixed, as documented by a recent report by the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI 2007) on European countries. In many episodes, the actual outcome of market opening has been disappointing. In the early stages of market integration in electricity generation in Italy (April 2004 -January 2005 , for instance, wholesale prices were liberalised, and the market was opened in the hope of importing competition from abroad. On the contrary, prices in neighbouring countries (namely, France) rose, and converged upward to the Italian level, in a situation where fuel prices were possibly relevant in Italy, but not so much in France (where nuclear power generation is paramount). The Italian electric-
